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ThispaperisfocusedonthesafetyofminiUAV(mUAV)systems.Itpresentsthegreateffortsthatarebeingdone
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1. Introduction
In the last few years, the Robotic Community has assisted to
an amazing increment of the mini unmanned aerial vehicles
(mUAVs) employment. They are being used for different
purposes and tasks, from agriculture to surveillance or res-
cue, both individually and in a cooperative way. Many steps
forward have been given up so far and there is a predictable
growing of this trend. Nevertheless, the daily work with
those physical platforms inevitably implies some risks (such
us platform or property damages, human injuries.) that are
disregarded most of the times.
Safety can be deﬁned as ‘the a state in which the system
is not in danger or at risk, free of injuries or losses’. This
state should be the ﬁrst requirement and target in every
application or design, and its legislation a priority for the
air authorities. However, there is a lack of safety policy
issuing aerial mobile units yet. In this way, it is important to
enhance the state of art of these policies and discuss about
the future policies that could augment the safety usage of
mUAVs. This paper highlights the present and estimates the
future of the legislation in this area (Section 2). Besides,
summarizes the international approach for risk analysis,
including hazard identiﬁcation (Section 3.1) and evaluation
(Section 3.2), as well as a group of techniques for risk
reduction and avoidance in mUAV systems (Section 3.3).
On the other hand, the current efforts have speciﬁc tar-
gets, deepening in the airworthiness certiﬁcation or in the
limitations established for the scenario and the pilots. In
general, global approaches are not considered. Neverthe-
less, they are really useful since allow to correlate more
than one cause with several effects, as well as to tackling
the safety guarantee from a comprehensive point of view. In
this sense, Section 3 bases on ISO 31000:2009 normative
to specify a three-step integral rationale method to perform
this process: Firstly, possible hazards should be identiﬁed
(Section 3.1), accordingly with their nature and the charac-
teristics of the system. After that, their potential damage
has to be estimated and assessed in the speciﬁc context
– both individually or together with other events. In this
regard, Section 3.2 speciﬁes the method used to perform
the evaluation. As Section 3.3 details, this is considered the
best way to afford an adequate response to the potential
problems, providing speciﬁc solutions depending on the
origin and the magnitude of the menace.
2. Legal framework
The ﬁrst point to be considered when evaluating the safe-
ness of a system is the legal framework that applies to the
system. It contains a previous analysis of the problem, so
the applications of its guideline helps to avoid or minimize
the main part of the risk that may arise. Nevertheless, legis-
lation analysis and study require a hard work in the sense of
discriminating the applying directives for each individual
case. This study deepens not only on the common norma-
tive –generalist, referred to machinery or electronic
equipment –, but also on the drones speciﬁcally. Further-
more, as the air legislation for mUAVs is quite uncertain
and diffuse, the current work has been also presented in
form of proposals and on-going normative.
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2.1. Common applying normative
As previously stated, even before analyzing the air-related
aspects of the UAVs, it is important to analyze their con-
strains from a higher point of view: ﬁrstly, considering their
nature as vehicles ormobilemachines. Secondly, evenmore
abstract, attending to their deﬁnition as complex systems
that interact among them (both internally and externally).
In this sense, the present regulations referring to machinery
and engineering systems are the following ones:
• ISO 12100:2010: ‘Safety of machinery. General
principles for design’.[1]
• ISO 14121-1:2007: ‘Safety of machinery. Risk
assessment’.[2]
• ISO 31000:2009: ‘Risk management. Principles and
guidelines’.[3]
• ISO 13849-1:2006: ‘Safety of machinery. Safety
related parts of control systems’.[4]
• IEC 31010:2009: ‘Risk management. Risk assessment
techniques’.[5]
Besides, from the systemic point of view, the UAV has
also to be considered as a collection of electronic devices.
In this regard, the regulations regarding to electromagnetic
compatibility, EMC (IEC/TR 61000-3-2 [6]), radio fre-
quency and communications (ISO/IEC 18000-1:2008 [7]),
or those referring to tracking, location, navigation, and geo-
graphic information in general (ISO 19133:2005 [8]) must
be observed.
2.2. General UAV normative: the international picture
Since the emergence of UnmannedAerial Vehicles is a rela-
tively new phenomenon, the regulation and legislation in its
regarding is mostly under development yet.[9] Besides, due
to the military origin of the UAVs, global standardization
has been postponed many times, turning out lately to be a
difﬁcult issue: each country has its own regulation, being in
many cases being inherited from the military policies.
However, the authorities and regulatory institutions have
recently realized about the relevance of UAVs in civil
applications. So, a major global effort has been taken in
order to give shape to a common regulation that may allow
UAVs to ﬂy globally: it started in 2005 with the Cross
Atlantic cooperation among the US Federal Aviation
Authority (FAA), the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), and Eurocontrol. During the process, two main
topics were settled: ﬁrstly, a common classiﬁcation for the
UAVs (see Table 1 [10]). Secondly, a set of metric and
procedures that have deﬁned the main lines for the common
policy.[12] In this sense, basing only on six characteristics
(i) mass, (ii) maximum ﬁght ranges, (iii) relative altitudes,
(iv) ﬂight endurance, (v) wing-type1, and (vi) ﬂight control
scheme 2), two different scopes were deﬁned:
• Operational approval: Applies to drones class I. It con-
sists of a proof demonstrating safe ﬂight capabilities,
licensing, training, and limitations of the system.
• Full regulations: Applies to drones class II. It requires
a certiﬁcation of airworthiness, vehicles registration,
design certiﬁcation, etc.
Basing on this, FAA imposed in the US a two-step cer-
tiﬁcation process before allowing any vehicle to operate
within the National Air Space (NAS): ﬁrstly, an airwor-
thiness certiﬁcation is required. Then, a waiver (Certiﬁ-
cate of Authorization, COA) regarding the operability of
the system and its collision avoidance capabilities have
obtained.[13,14]
In the same line, European legislation has deﬁned a sim-
ilar procedure. Nevertheless, as far as the cooperation only
focused on big–medium UAVs, EASA’s scopes have been
focused on addressing UAVs with a take-off weight
(MTOW) over 330 lb/150 kg [15]: small UAVs (also called
Light UAVs, LUAS) regulation has been diverted to the cor-
responding EU’sAirAuthorities. In this regard, themost ad-
vanced civil frameworks for regulating the safe operation of
UAVs (either civil ormilitary) are located in theUK,France,
and Austria. On the other hand, from the military point of
view, regulations inGermany, Croatia, CzechRepublic, and
Sweden should be highlighted [16]: They regulate common
aspects, mainly centered in the dynamics of the vehicle and
the safety of the environment. In the ﬁrst aspect, common
rules are deﬁned, such as the maximum velocity (90 kts 
46m/s), the maximum kinetic energy on impact (95KJ), or
the maximum height above the surface (400 ft  122m).
Other regulations are not standard, and differ depending on
the country air authorities: (i) the maximum distance to the
operator (e.g. 500m, 1 km or Visual Line-of-Sight, VSL),
and (ii) position lights requirement.
These data agree with other countries regulations:
• Australia (CASA): Civil Aviation Safety Regulations,
CASR. Part 101.[17,18]
• France (DGA): UAV Systems Airworthiness Require-
ments (USAR) [19]
• Israel (CAII):UAVSyst.AirworthinessRegulations.[20]
• Japan (JUAV): Safety standard for commercial use,
unmanned, rotary-wing aircraft in uninhabited
areas.[21]
• UK (CAA): Light UAV Systems Policy (LUAS).[22]
• USA (FAA): AC91-57,AFS-400 UAS Policy 05-01
[23]
However, despite the operational/environmental restric-
tions have a common base, they have been speciﬁed differ-
ently on each country: for example, the maximum distance
to populated areas (between 150 and 500m), the distance to
outsider (between 50 and 200m), the maximum distance
to airports/military zones (between 2 and 5Km), or the
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Table 1. Light UAV classiﬁcation according to [10,11].
Initials Name Mass Range Altitude Endurance
u Micro < 5 kg < 10 km 250m < 1 h
m Mini 5–15Kg < 10 km 150m < 2 h
CR Close Range 25–150 kg 10–30 km 3000m < 4h
SR Short Range 50–250 kg 30–70 km 3000m < 6h
MR Medium Range 150–500 kg 70–200 km 5000m < 10 h
Table 2. Comparison of the current UAV proposals/legislation.
NOCa ORG. NORMATIVE b
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
AUS (N) CASA X X X
ESP (P) MDE X X X X X X X X X X X
FRA (N) DGA X X X X X X X X X X
GBR (P) CAA X X X X X X X
GER (N) BWB-WTD X X X X X X X X
ITA (P) ENAC X X X X X X X X X X X X X
ISR (N) CAAI X X X X X
JPN (P) JUAV X X X X X X
SWE (P) FMV X X X X X X X X X X
USA (N) FAA X X X X X X X
aNOC corresponds to the international acronym of the country. The actual status of the normative is presented between parenthesis: P stands for proposal,
N for established normative.
bIn the normative, 1 corresponds to the classiﬁcation of the drone according to its weight ( 150 kg); 2 maximum ﬂight speed under 36m/s; 3 maximum
distance to the pilot under 500m; 4 maximum relative height under 122m (400 feet); 5 maximum kinetic energy on impact under 95KJ; 6 minimum distance
to populated areas under 150m; 7 minimum distance to any individual person under 100m; 8 airplane modeling license required; 9 drone required to ﬂy
under visual line of sight (VLOS); 10 not allowed to carry people or animals; 11 ATM civil certiﬁcation for ﬂying in a non-segregated airspace required;
12 airworthiness ofﬁcial certiﬁcation required; 13 Flight Guidance System (FGS) and lighting systems required; 14 ofﬁcial ﬂight authorization required in
private areas/ﬁelds.
suitable areas for taking-off/landing [24] have quite differ-
ent values. Furthermore, beyond the minimums established
by the FAA–EASA cooperation, the some of the issues
considered by each regulation are really diverse. Table 2
presents the comparison that has been done regarding those
considerations:
2.3. Ongoing normative and proposals.Working groups
and organism involved
As it has been presented in Section 2.2, the international pic-
ture regarding to the mUAVs regulation is fragmented and
divided. However, efforts are being done in this direction:
despite a common normative does not seem to be achieved
in a short/medium period,[25] many organisms and organi-
zations are involved in the mUAV regulation. In this sense,
apart from the national air authorities, there aremanygroups
gathering manufacturers, users, designers, and researchers
attempting to establish a common frame to regulate safety
on UAVoperation. They all establish guidelines and/or pro-
vide with recommendations. Nevertheless, it is necessary
to highlight the work done by EUROCAE (Speciﬁcally the
Working Group 73), USICO, JARUS (Joint Authorities for
Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems), ICAO (International
Civil Aviation Organization), and UVS International: alt-
hough their documents have no ofﬁcial validity, they are
taken into account when deﬁning the ofﬁcial regulation.
Even more, they are usually used as common guidelines
until the legislation releases.
Besides, both the ofﬁcial organisms Joint Aviation Au-
thority (JAA) and Eurocontrol have assembled a joint group
named UAV Task Force. It has aimed to issue a proposal
report – regarding safety requirements – according to the
suggestions of the aforementioned partners.[26] As a result
of this, it has been established a common criteria for deter-
mining the direction of the future common regulatory pol-
icy: ‘UAVs must comply with an equivalent level of safety
(ELOS) compared to conventionally manned aircraft’.[27]
So, considering the air trafﬁc standards, this delineation has
established the minimums required for the development of
the future policy.
3. Risk analysis
Even fulﬁlling all the applying normative and observing
every aspect of the legislation, there is always a poten-
tial risk involved in any process: risks are inherent to
action, and it is impossible to completely avoid them.
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Control, mitigate, and/or reduce them is the best possible
thing to do. In this sense, RMas – also known as Risk
Analysis architectures (RAas) – focus on this target, trying
to identify, classify, and evaluate the hazards in order to
delimit their effects and coverage.[28,29] Besides, since
RMas are generic evaluative frameworks, they have been
employed in multitude of ﬁelds and areas. Economists,
engineers, consultants, or merchants have adapted similar
structures to their workspace and requirements.[30] For
example, Chapman’s PRAM (Project Risk Analysis and
Management) methodology – which integrates RA as a
subtaskwithin eachproject –, has been considered in diverse
ﬁelds: construction.[31] projectmanagement [32], and even
aviation.3[33]
Focusing on the engineering processes and systems,most
of the RMa adaptations understand risk as a bond between
event and undesirable consequences (that should be avoided
or minimized). According to how these bonds are consid-
ered, two different approaches have emerged: on the one
hand, methods that analyze the nature of those links, focus-
ing on their temporal behavior; on the other, architectures
trying to ﬁnd the causes originating the events in order to
control their repercussions from the beginning.
Among the ﬁrst ones – those focusing on the frequency
and effects of the incidents – event-driven feedback meth-
ods are themost popular ones due to their ﬂexibility. For ex-
ample,Kuchard proposed a structure basedon events,where
faults are modeled in terms of occurrences (that have been
caused by anomalies, malfunctions, human errors, etc).[34]
Its top-down architecture is a particularization of the com-
mon Fault Tree Analysis (FTA),[35] that was afterwards
used by Murtha to propose a standard design for reliable
UAVs.[36] Likewise,Apthorpe combines both Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA) [37] and the Event Tree Analysis
(ETA) [38] decomposition into basic events to estimate
the system reliability.[39] Used in the EUROCONTROL’s
Safety Assessment Methodology, his approach combines
logic models (of the ways systems can fail) with statistical
failure rates in order to associate failure probabilities with
consequences.
Contrarily, the second branch of Risk Analysis architec-
tures analyze the origins of the thread, focusing on the
source–consequence relationship. For example, both the
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and the Fault
HazardAnalysis (FHA) methodologies determine potential
causes and probabilities of these risks.[40,41] Then, they
both – with different depth levels – associate the mod-
els created with resultant effects to the subsystem and its
operation.[33] Likewise, Hazard Operability Study
(HAZOP) [42] and Statistical Process Control (SPC) [43]
identify and monitor potential problems to statistically det-
ermine relationships and bonds. Even the methodologies
that consider the system as a whole – those focusing on
the general behaviur, instead on the speciﬁc events – try
to establish relationships among circumstances and errors:
for example, Celik’s Common Cause Analysis (CCA) and
Root cause analysis (RCA) allow to identify and associate
common errors (events) in order to eliminate redundancies
by [44,45].
The previously commented ISO 31000:2009 standard
emerged as an attempt to combine both approaches.[3] De-
picted in Figure 1,4 it combines most of the strengths pro-
posed by the rest of architectures in a modular approach:
it provides with a ﬂexible and adaptive linear-but-feedback
RA scheme that analyzes the system reliability in terms
of effect-to-cause. It considers both bottom-up and top-
downmanners (deductive or inductive, respectively), deﬁn-
ing the system’s speciﬁcations within the ﬁrst stage of the
RAprocess. Besides, it combines both ’event management’
and ’a priori information’ approaches in the event-based
methods, providing with a higher adaptability. Finally, ISO
31000:2009 also includes the reduction procedures within
the analysis process, guaranteeing a higher robustness and
suitability degree.
This behavior is achieved by implementing a three-step
architecture that allows to make independent evaluations
but maintaining a global view: as it is possible to appreciate
in the ﬁgure, problems from one stage can ﬁnd their solution
(i.e. avoidance/reduction) in the following phases. Like-
wise, problems can be back-propagated in order to discover
potential sources/origins in previous stages.
In this regard, ﬁrst step in the process – after deﬁning the
requirements and speciﬁcations of the system – is the state-
ment of the boundaries. They limit not only the system but
also the operating framework (Section 3.1). Once enclosed
the dangers, the possible risks (i.e. failures, malfunctions,
etc.) should be found. The search is narrowed according
to the nature of the danger and the origin of the hazards.
Finally, the risks found are evaluated according to ISO
13.849-1:2006 methodology and classiﬁed depending on
their severity.
The information extracted during the analysis ismanaged
in order to minimize or avoid the risk. This Risk Reduction
Procedure (RRP) is presented in Section 3.3, but it is impor-
tant to anticipate that this structure is not linear, since the
introduction of new measures or techniques for minimizing
or avoiding the risks may introduce new hazards. From
this point, a recursive evaluation of the risk is necessary,
not only for assess the performance of the solution but
also their effects in the system behavior. Nevertheless, this
architecture might go into an endless loop. Due to this,
the loop has a limited number of iterations that force a
redeﬁnition of the system’s speciﬁcations if it is not possible
to equate the risk level to the one required.
For all these reasons, this procedure has been considered
the most suitable one to implement a RAa for a drone. Thus,
following subsections present how the standard has been
customized in order to adapt these structures to analyze the
risk of outdoor UAV missions.
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Figure 1. Simpliﬁed architecture of the risk assessment and risk reduction.
3.1. Risk identiﬁcation
As previously stated, before analyzing the potential haz-
ards of the system, it is necessary to state the limits of the
operation so as to enclose the possible consequences of an
accident or failure.[46] So, focusing onmUAVoutdoormis-
sions, physical/temporal requirements are derived from the
normative and applying regulations and the manufacturer’s
speciﬁcations, logic and previous experiences.[47] Thus,
restrictions are not only imposed to the equipment, but also
to the environment and to the ﬂight procedures. It is possible
to divide the limits according to their nature:
(1) Physical limits (Unit and components):. They refers to
the kinematic and dynamic restrictions imposed by/to
the mUAV. Their origin (self or imposed) may derive
from the physical restrictions of the machine itself or
from the dispositions of the legal framework. For ex-
ample, maximum payload (or the equivalent Maximum
Take-OffWeight,MTOW) ormaximum speed is clearly
deﬁned by the drone’s characteristics, but other restric-
tions have not so well deﬁned their origin. In these
cases (e.g. maximum/minimum height or theMaximum
kineticEnergyon Impact), limits are deﬁnedby themost
restrictive source.
(2) Temporal limits (Life time):. Temporal restrictions are
derived from the degradation or efﬁciency-loss of the
drone’s components. In this sense, short time (e.g. max-
imum time of ﬂight, time of response of the commands
or acquisition time of the sensors) or long time (e.g.
engines and battery degradation) restrictions should be
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considered, establishing a safetymargin in order to guar-
antee their behavior.
(3) Environmental limits (Flight location and conditions):.
As in the physical restrictions, limits are imposed by the
own drones or/and by the legislation, although the scope
is more clear. Weather conditions such us wind speed,
ambient light, or dust/rain presence should be taken
into account from the platform side. On the other hand,
the minimum distance from populated areas or from
airports/military installations, the inclusion of the drone
in the non-segregated airspace, or the GPS coverage
must be also considered.
(4) Behavioral limits (Operation and procedures):. Finally,
ﬂight constrains are applied in the operation, affecting
to the procedures and actions of the pilot (both au-
tonomous and manual). Could be included in this topic
the minimum distance to the operator or the algorithmic
and sensing capacities of the vehicle (environmental
known).
The lack of respect for these restrictions unquestionably
supposes a potential hazardous situation. Nevertheless, as
previously said, since the regulations are ﬁxed and static
they do not cover all the possible risky situations of the
evolving UAVs and their circumstances. Therefore, it is
possible to limit the hazards constraining the characteristics
of the ﬂight, but to avoid them completely is impossible.
So, even assuming the operation conditions satisfy the
applying normative and that the operation is framed ac-
cording to the previously explained, it is required to analyze
which are the potential hazards to be found. In this sense,
the drone’s potential risks can be classiﬁed attending to their
sources, dividing them between intrinsic system’s problems
and outside sources:
(1) External sources are those whose behavior and/or pres-
ence is not related or connected with the mUAV itself.
Since they are not manageable, their presence supposes
an extra risk that should be considered. The interfer-
ence of third-party agents (e.g. animals, humans, other
equips, EMC emitters, etc.), the environmental condi-
tions (e.g. wind, temperature, GPS signal quality.) or
the presence of dynamic elements – where both relative
movement and interaction should be considered – is the
main sources of external hazards.[48,49]
(2) Internal sources are those relatedwith the drone’s opera-
tion/performance, derived from one of more procedures
associated to the application. The analysis performed is
depicted in the Table 3. It presents the activities related
with the ﬂight that may provoke a breakdown or a risky
situation.
External risks can be evaded using avoidance techniques
and mechanisms. Nevertheless, internal-sources hazard are
completely unavoidable. Their rate can be decreased and
their effects minimized or enclosed, but it is not possible
to eliminate them. So, it is mandatory to analyze which are
their sources and which are the possible consequences in
order to evaluate their possible effects later. Considering
breakdowns as the main internal hazard source for UAVs,
their nature has been analyzed. In this sense, they can be
classiﬁed attending to their origin and taking into account
the magnitude affected by its effect [50]: Table 4 presents
a relation of hazardous events, established in this work
according to their physical type. It provides, as well, with
some examples of the possible consequences of the hazards
action.[51] It should be noted that the risks are interrelated,
so a hazard could be classiﬁed in several different groups.
As well, the consequences or problems caused could also
be originated by different hazards. So, classiﬁcation in this
table has been done according to their occurrence prob-
ability and their deep composition or characteristics, but
considering the problems of hazard combination.[52]
3.2. Risk assessment
Once identiﬁed the candidate risks sources and their na-
ture, the second step implies estimating the seriousness and
severity of their effects (i.e. to appraise the consequences of
a potential breakdown or accident during theUAVmission).
In this sense, according with ISO 14121 – as well as in most
of the risk evaluation methods,[53,54] hazard assessment is
a function of two factors: the ﬁrst one refers to the severity of
the damage that evaluates in a fuzzy way the harm resultant
from an hypothetical incident. On the other hand, the second
factor deﬁnes the probability of occurrence, determining the
frequency of exposition to the risks. The relation between
these factors determines the risk level of the component.
The summation of the risk estimation for every component
and procedure in the system outputs the global risk ﬁgure.
(1) Seriousness of damage:As previously said, the serious-
ness of the damage evaluates the harm that could be
provoked in an accident. Potential damage is key factor
to estimate the risk associate to a component, deﬁning
in this sense the importance of the processes where the
damage has his origins. Seriousness rate is composed
of two factors: Firstly, the severity of the injuries or
the damage to health (both for the drone and for the
element it crashed into). This aspect is assessed in a
fuzzy way, and generates a scaled output according not
to the percentage of destruction but with the evaluation
of the impact/importance in the system.According with
the international normative, only reversible and irre-
versible damages are considered in the scale, although
we propose an intermediate (light / serious / death or
destruction) would be positive in order to improve the
characterization of the damages.[55]
Second factor – which it is not considered in the ac-
tual legislation but that has been proposed in many
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Table 3. Analysis of hazards internal sources.
Stage Activity
Preparation Manufacture, Load, Transport, Assembly,Handle,Packaging
Startup Setup,Assemble,Adjustment, Connections, Test, Installation, Integration (e.g. payload mount/unmount)
Operation Piloting, Human intervention, Setup, Supervision, Humanmanipulation,Violations of safety procedures,
Veriﬁcation, OS hung up
Maintenance Settings, Cleaning, Conservation, Lubrication, Periodicity, Suitability, Cleaning, Charging process of
batteries
Design Materials, Components, Physical stability, Resistance, Compliance, Software
Control Algorithmic stability, Time of response, Refresh rate, Accuracy, Error handling, Hysteresis, Software
Virus
Table 4. Analysis of the hazards according to their nature.
Type Sources Consequences
Mechanical hazards Impacts, Emissions, Give-offs, Collisions,
Breaks, Friction, Pressure, Inadequate bal-
ance/stability, Mobile parts
Run over, Crush, Cut or section, Drag or
entrapment, Hook, Friction or abrasion, Impact,
Injection, Puncture, piercing
Power supply breakdowns Violation of maximum absolute ratings, No
energy, Perform variation, Short circuit, Polar-
ization
Decelerations, Accelerations, Burn, Overheat-
ing, Falls, Motor stop, Saturation
Thermal hazards Overheat, Flames, Freeze,Abrasion, Explosions Burn, Freeze, Battery problems, CPU auto
switch-off, Injuries from radiation heat, Dehy-
dration
Electronic hazards Saturation, Overﬂows, Derives, Isolating inap-
propriate, Synchronization, I/O errors, Discon-
nection
Overheating, Sensors confusion, Radiations,
Control loose, Short circuiting
Electromagnetic & Radiation Hazards Electrostatic phenomena, Interferences, Ioniz-
ing radiations, Spectrum saturation
Disorientation, Failures in active components,
Overheating, Erroneous reception/send, Inter-
ferences in the communications, Drone out of
control, Sensors inconsistency
Algorithmic hazards Inﬁnite loops, Inadequate values, Values out of
range,Delayed process, Sequencing,Overﬂows,
Synchronization
Drone out of control, Reception/send wrong
parameters, Synchronization failures
scales, corresponds to the number and afﬁliation of the
agents involved in the event. It should be distinguished
among critical and non-critical components, as well
as if people or third-party elements affected. In this
sense, the classiﬁcation proposed: components of the
mUAV, the drone itself, the payload (in case of exist),
external infrastructures or objects, the operator (the pilot
or anyone involved in the UAV operation), one person
or several people.
(2) Probability of damage: This ﬁgure estimates the fre-
quency of occurrence of a hazardous event. The incident
rate, as a function of the systemuse, is the value resultant
from the composition of three factors [55,56]:
• Exposition to the danger: These data evaluate the quan-
tity of risk the drone has been exposed to. In order to
evaluate it, it should be taken into account the expo-
sition time (mean period T of exposition every time
it is exposed), the number of agents exposed (in case
of being a ﬂeet), the kind of exposition (e.g. manual
or not, normal operation or emergency mode) and the
frequency of exposition, meaning the time exposed to
the risk over the total time of operation (e.g. to the
collisions risk, total time when the drone is close to
another object, over the total ﬂight time).
• Probability of occurrence of a hazardous event: The
frequency of incidents can be determined experimen-
tally or/and provided by the manufacturers. The event
rate derived from the human intervention or not specif-
ically detailed (because the component has not been
veriﬁed or because its veriﬁcation is not conclusive) is
determined by means of statistics and history: Statis-
tical reliability, accident history, and similarities with
other systems [57]
• Ability to prevent the risk or limit damage:The aptitude
to avoid a hazardous situation or limit harm in case
of accident inﬂuences the probability of occurrence
of such damage. In this sense, both aptitudes mitigate
the global risk, so should be taken into account as an
active factor. The issues related with this capacities are
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the people/operator skills (e.g. reﬂexes, agility, ability
to escape), the speed of the events, the perception of
risk (general information, direct observation, warning
signs), the operator qualiﬁcation and experience, and
the suitability of the guards and safety systems (risk
identiﬁcation, agents involved, usability, possible in-
terferences, etc.)
According to all these factors, a general evaluation of
the selected risk is performed. As depicted in the Figure 2,
the factors described above are combined using the Kin-
ney method in order to obtain the Performance Level (PL)
metric.[58,59] PL is employed to manage the assessed haz-
ard and refers to the general reliability required by the com-
ponent/system in order to operate under safety conditions
(probability of a dangerous failure per hour). This metric
considers both quantity (e.g. measurements of reliability,
ability to resist failures, etc.) and quality aspects (i.e. sys-
tem’s performance upon failure conditions, failure monitor-
ing, and safety related to software implementations).
3.3. Risk reduction
Once determined the possible hazards, their sources as well
as possible effects, the last stage is to analyze and estab-
lish possible methods for avoiding or limiting the possi-
ble harm. The reliability level required, robustness needed,
and performance requirements are deﬁned in the chart pre-
sented in the Figure 3: it establishes a relationship among
four different parameters, related to the conﬁdence on the
drone’s capabilities. Apart from the PL determined before
(see Section 3.2), a fuzzy ﬁgure for the MTTF (Mean Time
To Failure) is deﬁned. It expresses the mean time until a
design’s or component’s ﬁrst failure and determines the
quality required to the components.As well, the Diagnostic
coverage (DC)ﬁgure is also deﬁned, quantifying the propor-
tion between the number dangerous failures detected and the
occasionswhen the failuremode has been activated. Finally,
the last feature refers to the category (Cat.): It determines
– in case of existing a controller – the control architecture
speciﬁed for guarantying an adequate safety level (Being
B not especial requirements and the numbers different con-
trol conﬁgurations). In this sense, for example, if both the
MTTF and DC of a mUAV are low, an architecture of type
2 (Cat. 2) will be required for obtaining an a/b perfor-
mance level – what is the minimum one required by the
regulation.
According this regulation (ISO 12100-1:2003), there are
three possible stages of where is possible to interact for
achieve these ﬁgures. First level tries to eliminate the hazard
by means of an inherent safe design (Chapter 4, of the
ISO normative). When it is not possible, second level per-
forms risk reduction by implementing protective and pre-
ventivemeasures. They are complementarymethods for the
intended use and reasonably foreseeable misuse
(Chapter 5); Finally, if no one of the previousmethodologies
is enough reduce the risk adequately, the imposition of
safety procedures is required. In this sense (Section 5.5 of
ISO normative):
(1) Design process: As described in Section 3, ﬁrst stage in
any design is the deﬁnition of the requirements and the
characteristics speciﬁcation. It is a critical phase, and
its inappropriate accomplishment makes possible the
presence of risk and problems in the following stages.
Thus, the appropriate materials, components and pro-
cedures election, as well as the careful deﬁnition of the
speciﬁcations is a crucial issue.[47]
Simulation is a signiﬁcant tool to determine the be-
havior and time response of the component simulated.
It allows identifying execution problems impossible to
determine in other ways – and estimate the probability
of occurrence of a hazardous event.Aswell, simulations
are really useful in order to adjust the probability level
introduced to the risk estimatorwhen trying to locate the
recurrent errors source. Thus, it should be deﬁned and
developed a test bed. Prototyping and veriﬁcation allow
the manufacturers and operators to evaluate the correct
performance and the correct system’s status of every
hazardous component or element of the system. Both
auto-check and visual inspection should be considered,
in order to corroborate system’s condition and identify
possible problems before executing the mission.
Finally, halfwaybetweenDesign andProtectionMea-
sures is situated the Control issue: In order to help the
designer, ISO 13849-1:2006 provides a methodology
based on the categorization of structures according to
speciﬁc design criteria and speciﬁed behaviors in case
of default. These categories are depicted in the Figure 4
and correspondwith the four categories extractedduring
the risk assessment process (Section 3.2).
As it is possible to appreciate in the image, the com-
plexity of the control structure is deﬁned accordingwith
the safety requirements (or, in other words, with the
hazard level): The higher the estimation hazard is, the
most sophisticated the scheme must be.
Category B does not imply any special requirements.
Moving forward, Cat. I requires from an close-loop
controller (L). It balances the measures acquired from
the environment and provides with an answer according
to it. This scheme is complemented with a supervisor
(S) in Category II, allowing to auto-detect errors or
failures in the owncontrol system.Besides, it also adds a
direct feedback information from the output to the con-
trol (L). Nevertheless, it could be not enough in really
dangerous situations. They requires architectures with
different levels of redundancy, like the ones described
in Categories III and IV. This kind of scheme it is not
only able to detect the problem, but also avoid it and
continue working.
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Figure 2. Evaluation of the hazard according to ISO 13849. Required Performance Level analysis1. S stands for Severity of Damage, F
for Frequency of Exposure to the hazard, and P for the capacity to avoid or limit the risk. In all the factors, sufﬁx 1 refers to the lower
level of the corresponding magnitude (e.g. S1 implies low potential damage) and 2 to the higher level (e.g. F2 depicts high exposure). On
the other hand, the performance levels (PL) range from A to E, as a representation of the failures/hour rate (presented in the upper right
corners.
Figure 3. Evaluation chart form MTTF, DC, and Control Category deﬁnition after the PL analysis and set up.
These structures should be applied when considering
protective devices (e.g. control devices, sensing sys-
tems, locking devices, etc.), control units (e.g. a logic
block, data processing units, etc.), and other control
elements (e.g. relays, safety switches, valves, etc.).Nev-
ertheless, as previously said, the inclusion of these
schemes should/must be not the unique measure in-
cluded: Redundancy structures, hardware supervisors,
and watchdogs, or ruggedization methods clearly imp-
rove the fail tolerance of the system.
(2) Prevention/Protection:Guards are elements not included
in the core of the system, but added in order to provide
a protection service. It is in charge of limit the damage
not only to the drone’s elements but also to third- party
agents. They are conceived as physical – both passive
and active – sentinels, capable to absorb kinematic en-
ergy or limit themovement of the air vehicles or the peo-
ple around it. Examples of these kinds of elements are
propeller protections, landing legs, parachute, airbags,
or protection nets.
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Figure 4. Control architectures derived from the risk analysis. Categories I, II and III/IV, respectively.
At all events, it is important to note that even if the
guards are not able provide a full safeness range, the
capacity of decreasing the exposition to the danger or
reduce its effects is equally valid. That is why warning
systems like horns or lighting are considered preventive
elements, since they allow to increase the reaction time
and the risk perception.
(3) Safety procedures: Procedures are required when it is
not possible to adequately avoid neither to minimize the
risks. They refer to all these activities related with every
stage of the system, necessaries to guarantee aminimum
safety level during the ﬂight. Operating procedures af-
fect both before, during, and after the mission.
First of all, veriﬁcation (e.g. check batteries, scan
frequencies in order to avoid interferences, measure
wind speed, etc.) and signaling (e.g. notiﬁcation to the
authorities or people involved directly or indirectly, in-
dications in the ﬂight area, etc.) are mandatory before
start the ﬂight. During the mission development, it is
also important to monitor the level, the data link perfor-
mance, etc. in order to detect possible problems. Finally,
a ﬂight report should be ﬁlled out, in order to have a
temporal register. It will help the maintenance process,
since it will be possible to get, for example, real data
about the motor or batteries use. Despite of being not
deeply treated in the normative or in the safety proce-
dures rules,maintenanceplays a fundamental role on the
global safeness. Its correct execution limits the proba-
bility of occurrence of a hazardous event. The activities
that maintenance involves are cleanliness, reparations,
replacement, adjustment, calibration, and veriﬁcation.
Finally, not include in the maintenance process itself,
but also perform before the mission, there are some
activities or issues related with the speciﬁc education
of the operators that increase the safety of the system.
These procedures increase the expertise with the system
and provide a good knowledge to avoid or manage haz-
ardous situations: qualiﬁcation, experience (e.g. simu-
lators), and update.
4. Conclusions
Worldwide normative in the mUAV ﬁeld is being improved
quickly, spending a great effort on increase the safeness
on these systems. Nevertheless, the work is not already
ﬁnished, and the existing legislation are uncertain and loose.
Safeness should be the ﬁrst requirement in every system,
and even more in those that can provoke a great damage.
Considering that plenty of systems are being develop
regarding external risk avoidance (sense & avoidance), the
main challenge is pointed in the internal ones. Risk
Analysis Architectures have been studied, since they are
the structures intended to reduce the risk levels. Among
all of them, ISO 31000:2009 has been found as the most
reliable and complete one, due to its feedback scheme and
its combination of both deductive and inductive structures.
Complemented by other regulations (ISO 14121-1:2007
and ISO/IEC 27005:2011), it has been focused and cus-
tomized in order to be applied intomUAVoutdoormissions.
Drones’ general features and scenario characteristics have
been considered – basing on the international regulations –
in order to provide with a guide for hazard analysis.
The three-step method (identiﬁcation, evaluation, and re-
duction) provides iterative way for assessing and managing
the actual hazards. Each one of the stages has been also
adjusted to themUAVscenario: drone’s typical breakdowns
have been studied and identiﬁed. They have been assessed
according to their relevance and nature, using the method-
ology proposed in the standard. Nevertheless, the method-
ology has been reﬁned and completed. Firstly, including
intermediate categories that match better the mUAV reality
(i.e. light/serious/destroyed instead reversible/irreversible).
Secondly, proposingnewmetrics (i.e. number and afﬁliation
of the agents involved) to evaluate the potential risk.
Finally, considering the drones capabilities, risk reduc-
tion alternatives have been studied. ISO 12100-1 has been
followed, deﬁning a multilevel architecture based on the
evaluation done. Control systems and guards have been
speciﬁcally adapted to mUAV.
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